The study argues that U.S. intervention is the most likely factor to end the mafia state regime on the island and prevent the nation’s physical disappearance. It also challenges the official narrative on sovereignty, patriotism, and the historical role of the United States

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Miami / Madrid (May 26) — A new report published by the think tank Cuba Siglo 21 has reignited one of the most controversial and emotionally charged debates in contemporary Cuba: the possibility of U.S. intervention as a means to end the political, economic, and humanitarian crisis currently plaguing the island.

Titled Intervention in Cuba: Undesirable, Preferable, or Essential?, the document argues that Cuba is undergoing an existential crisis comparable—and even greater—than that of the late 19th century and contends that, given current conditions, decisive U.S. assistance is the factor most likely to lead to a free and prosperous Cuba.

The thesis directly challenges decades of official narrative on sovereignty and patriotism. According to the essay, the contemporary debate does not revolve around ideological preferences or sympathies toward Washington, but rather a concrete and urgent question: Can a people who are impoverished, unarmed, fragmented, and subjugated by a repressive apparatus reclaim their lost sovereignty on their own?

The Mirror of 1898: Heroes Turned “Traitors”

The historian and author of the essay, Juan Antonio Blanco, draws a direct parallel between the current Cuban situation and the crisis of the War of Independence. He recalls that, at the end of the 19th century, Cuban independence fighters faced a devastating scenario: hunger, epidemics, economic destruction, and a war against a militarily superior colonial power that, for many, still had no clear outcome.

Far from the simplified and widely circulated image, the text argues, the U.S. intervention of 1898 was neither an act imposed by Washington nor a historical accident, but rather the result of deliberate maneuvering by some of the principal mambí leaders and representatives in the United States of the Cuban Revolutionary Party.

Máximo Gómez, Tomás Estrada Palma, and others reportedly concluded by late 1896 that achieving victory solely with their own forces in the short term was an uncertain prospect and began actively promoting U.S. involvement.

This historical reinterpretation leads to a particularly provocative assertion in the document: under the current Cuban government’s narrative, figures such as Máximo Gómez and even Antonio Maceo would today be labeled “traitors” or “annexationists.”

The dossier reveals that Antonio Maceo welcomed the political change represented by the election of William McKinley and went so far as to spread among his troops the positive expectation of a U.S. intervention, while Gómez and Estrada Palma carried out diplomatic efforts to secure that support.

“What is under discussion today,” the study argues, “is the very viability of the Cuban nation in the 21st century.”

The Helms-Burton Act as a guarantor of sovereignty

In contrast to the official narrative that portrays any external interference as the end of the nation, the sources maintain that there are legal mechanisms designed precisely to protect Cuban sovereignty.

Just as the Teller Amendment in 1898 guaranteed that the U.S. would not annex the island, the current Helms-Burton Act governs U.S. policy toward Cuba under the commitment that, following an initial stabilization phase, free elections will be held to return sovereign control to the Cuban people.

The fear of annexation is identified as an empty propaganda ploy, since today no relevant political force in the U.S. wishes to shoulder the fiscal and immigration burden that integrating millions of impoverished citizens would entail. Although annexation and statehood are not the same thing, the first step may eventually open the door to the second.

Debunking the “manipulation of fear”

The document devotes a significant portion to debunking what it calls “the manipulation of fear.” According to Blanco, the Cuban government and allied sectors have turned fear into a political tool to discredit any debate on external support.

The idea of annexation, warnings about inevitable indiscriminate massacres by foreign troops, the alleged future economic plundering by the United States and Cuban Americans, or the notion that the people would fiercely resist an intervention are presented by the dossier as propaganda tactics aimed at stifling debate.

The study systematically refutes these arguments:

  • Sovereignty: One cannot violate a sovereignty that does not exist because it has already been violated by a totalitarian group since 1959 by eliminating the right to free elections.
  • Violence: In the face of fears of massacres, it is emphasized that modern technologies enable surgical and selective attacks against repressive forces, thereby limiting collateral casualties and avoiding harm to the civilian population.
  • Historical hypocrisy: Those who today wave “anti-imperialist” flags were in the past the greatest “pro-Soviet annexationists,” handing over national territory for USSR military bases and making the economy dependent on the Kremlin.

A fringe idea?

The dossier asserts that the idea of the possibility of some form of U.S. intervention or coercive support has become “normalized” both inside and outside Cuba.

Recent polls cited by the study suggest that a significant portion of the population views this possibility favorably in light of the rapid deterioration of living conditions and the lack of prospects for change.

For Cuba Siglo 21, the discussion ceased to belong to the realm of the unthinkable and, in 2026, entered the Overton Window of reasonable criteria.

A debate that is just beginning

The dossier’s conclusions are unequivocal.

Blanco believes that maintaining the status quo is unviable and that opposition based exclusively on denunciations, peaceful protests, and calls for dialogue is unlikely to alter the existing balance of power on its own. Nor can a starving, unarmed, and disconnected people overcome the brutality of the repressive apparatus on their own.

The study identifies as the most likely scenario with the greatest chance of success a combination of massive internal protests protected by coercive support—including military support—from the United States and its ability to selectively punish repressive forces.

The dossier pursues a clear objective: to break the silence, open the debate, and force a reevaluation of old certainties regarding patriotism, sovereignty, and the historical lessons of 1898.

In a country where social exhaustion and despair are growing at the same pace as the crisis, the question it leaves open is uncomfortable but difficult to avoid: if the mambises asked for help when freedom seemed unattainable, why is it that today this debate is still treated as taboo?